In this paper we study the properties of eventually consistent distributed systems that feature arbitrarily complex semantics and mix eventual and strong consistency. These systems execute requests in a highly-available, weakly-consistent fashion, but also enable stronger guarantees through additional inter-replica synchronization mechanisms that require the ability to solve distributed consensus. We use the seminal Bayou system as a case study, and then generalize our findings to a whole class of systems. We show dubious and unintuitive behaviour exhibited by those systems and provide a theoretical framework for reasoning about their correctness. We also state an impossibility result that formally proves the inherent limitation of such systems, namely temporary operation reordering, which admits interim disagreement between replicas on the relative order in which the client requests were executed.
Introduction
Eventually consistent replicated systems, such as modern NoSQL databases (e.g., [1] [2] [3] ), are known for their high availability and impressive scalability. However, these desirable traits come at the expense of limited semantics and weak correctness guarantees. For example, NoSQL systems typically guarantee only eventual consistency, which means that the system replicas eventually converge to the same state once the stream of state updates ceases [4] . NoSQL data stores also often provide only a simple key-value API and feature no support for transactional processing. On the other hand, strongly consistent solutions, such as traditional database management systems (DBMS) [5] or service/data replication schemes based on atomic commitment protocols [6] [7] [8], feature complex concurrency control mechanisms that enable, e.g., serializable transactions, which in principle allow one to program arbitrarily complex application logic.
Understandably, the programmers that use eventually consistent solutions often miss some of the features and properties of the traditional, strongly consistent systems. 1 The workarounds they develop are often not optimal performance-wise and do not account for many edge cases. This is why several attempts have been made to enrich the semantics of eventually consistent systems and strengthen their guarantees (e.g., [11] [12] ). Ensuring guarantees stronger than eventual consistency entails additional inter-process synchronization. Enabling the support for some relatively basic operations, such as putIfAbsent in a key-value data store, requires the ability to solve distributed consensus. The proper scheduling of such operations and the operations that can be executed in a highly-available fashion (e.g. a blind write operation to a register) is non-trivial. In fact, in some systems using both classes of operations to access the same data results in an undefined behaviour [13] . Our goal is to study this topic formally, in order to explain the problems and establish solid theoretical foundations for the envisioned systems that provide rich semantics and seamlessly mix eventual (weak) and strong consistency.
In this paper we study the properties of eventually consistent distributed systems that feature mechanisms that allow them to achieve stronger guarantees through the consensus-based synchronization. We do so by revisiting Bayou [11] , one of the first always available, eventually consistent data stores. Each Bayou server speculatively total-orders all received client requests using a simple timestamp-based mechanism and without prior agreement with other servers. This way a Bayou process (which we call a replica) can respond to a request even in the presence of network partitions in the system. In the background, Bayou replicas synchronize to enforce the final request execution order, as established by a primary replica. When desired, the client may wait until the request stabilizes, i.e., it is processed according to the final execution order so the response can never change. In effect, Bayou combines timestamp-based eventual consistency [4] and serializability [14] . For the purpose of our analysis we assume that requests in Bayou are arbitrary but deterministic transactions, specified, e.g., in SQL. It means that by abstracting Bayou, we obtain a model of a distributed system with arbitrarily complex semantics that mixes eventual and strong consistency. The semantics are formalized by a specification of a sequential data type exporting a set of operations available to the clients.
We demonstrate three phenomena present in Bayou that may come as dubious and unintuitive, which make reasoning about the system's behaviour very tricky. Interestingly, they are never exhibited by popular NoSQL systems (which guarantee only eventual consistency), nor by strongly consistent solutions. In the first phenomenon, which we call temporary operation reordering, the replicas may temporarily disagree on the relative order in which the requests (modeled as operations) submitted to the system were executed. The second phenomenon, circular causality, signifies a situation in which, by examining the return values of the operations processed by a system, one may discover a cycle in the causal dependency between the operations. Both of these anomalies are present in Bayou, because it features two incompatible ways of ordering operation executions. Finally, we show that, unlike many existing eventually consistent data stores, Bayou does not guarantee bounded wait-free execution of operations, i.e., there does not exist a bound on the number of steps of the Bayou protocol that a replica takes before returning a response to the client. It is surprising, because the result holds also when the clients do not wait for the requests to stabilize.
Our paper introduces a theoretical framework that can be used for formal reasoning about systems that enable mixing eventual and strong semantics, similarly to Bayou. Our framework builds on the formalism introduced by Burckhardt et al. [15] [16] . We use the framework to model the guarantees offered by Bayou and systems similar to it. We do so by introducing Fluctuating Eventual Consistency (FEC), a new correctness property, which admits temporary operation reordering. We formally prove that Bayou satisfies FEC. 2 The central contribution of our paper is an impossibility result which formally shows that temporary operation reordering cannot be avoided in Bayou-like systems (e.g., [17] [18] ), which mix eventual and strong consistency. This phenomenon cannot be avoided in systems that feature arbitrarily complex semantics (e.g., consensus-based strong operations or serializable transactions), and at the same time ensure the crucial requirement of eventual consistency: in the presence of network partitions the system replicas that belong to the same partition eventually converge to the same state.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe Bayou, demonstrate its quirky behaviour. In Sections 3 and 4 we introduce the formal framework for reasoning about Bayou-like systems and specify FEC, our new correctness criterion. In Section 5 we give our impossibility result. We briefly discuss related work in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
A short version of this paper appeared in [19] .
2 Mixing weak and strong semantics: case study
The Bayou protocol
Now we discuss the Bayou protocol [11] in more detail. To make our analysis easier, we modify the original Bayou protocol in few ways. The original Bayou protocol allows one to specify readonly queries and updating transactions that do not provide a return value. Moreover, Bayou also features dependency check and merge procedure mechanisms, that allow the system to perform application-level conflict detection and resolution. We abstract away from these mechanisms by allowing the client requests to specify arbitrary complex transactions that can provide a return value even for updating transactions (dependency checks and merge procedures can be emulated on the level of operation specification, see below). The original Bayou protocol also featured a primary that established the final request execution order. Obviously, this approach is not fault-tolerant. We replace primary with Total Order Broadcast (TOB) [20] mechanism, which guarantees that all replicas receive all messages broadcast using TOB in the same order. Achiving TOB requires solving distributed consensus. Therefore we equip replicas with a failure detector (e.g., failure detector Ω [21] ). The complete system model is given in Appendix A.2.1.
Consider the pseudocode in Algorithm 1, which specifies the Bayou protocol for process i. The processes, which we call the replicas, are independent and communicate by message-passing. Clients submit requests to the Bayou system in the form of operations with encoded arguments (line 9), and await responses. Operations are defined by a specification of a replicated data type F (e.g., read/write operations on a register, list operations, such as append, getFirst, or arbitrary SQL queries/updates; see also Section 3.4). Operations are executed on the state object (line 4), which encapsulates the state of a copy of a replicated object implementing F (in Appendix A.2.2 we show how StateObject can be implemented).
When a client submits an operation op to a replica, it is broadcast within a Req message using both regular Reliable Broadcast (RB) as well as TOB (lines 12 and 13); we say that the operation has been RB-cast and TOB-cast, respectively. Through the code in line 14 we simulate immediate local RB-delivery of op. Since we use RB and TOB to disseminate messages, each operation is delivered by each replica twice (lines 22 and 27). Only upon delivery by TOB (line 27) the final order of the operation execution is established (as reflected by the committed list). A replica that delivered an operation, whose final execution order is not yet established, keeps the operation on the tentative list (the operations on the tentative list are sorted using timestamps, replica numbers and the numbers of the already invoked operations, local to each replica). The concatenation of the committed and tentative lists (denoted committed · tentative) represents the current order in which operations are evaluated by the replica. The replica deterministically executes operations in this order one by one on the state object (line 47). This is why at any moment, the value of state corresponds to a sequence s of the already executed operations on a replica given (s is a prefix of committed ·tentative). Note that state allows us to easily rollback a suffix of s (line 43). The replica keeps additional data structures, such as executed and toBeExecuted , to keep track of its progress.
When a replica delivers an operation op, op might be ordered before some operations that are already delivered by the replica (but not before any other operation delivered by TOB). Then the committed and tentative are changed accordingly (lines 19, [28] [29] and the replica may have to roll back some of the already executed operations (line 43) and reexecute them after executing op. Intuitively, the replicas converge to the same state, which is reflected by the committed · tentative list of operations. More precisely, when the stream of operations incoming to the system ceases and there are no network partitions, the committed lists at all replicas will be the same, whereas the tentative lists will be empty. On the other hand, when there are partitions, some operations might not be successfully TOB-cast, but will be disseminated within a partition using RB. Then all replicas within the same partition will have the same committed and (non-empty) tentative lists.
We distinguish two kinds of operations: weak and strong (line 9). Unlike strong operations, weak operations are executed in a highly-available fashion, which means that a response is returned to the client before the final operation execution order is established. This way any weak operation is non-blocking (with respect to network communication), but its ultimate impact on the system's state might differ from what the client can infer from the response (if the final execution order differs from the tentative one). On the other hand, a strong operation returns a response only after the final execution order is established. Hence the guarantees on the execution order of strong operations are more stringent compared to the guarantees of weak operations (see Section 4) 
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38: 55: Figure 1 shows an execution of a two-replica system built on top of Bayou and implementing a list that is initially empty. Firstly, R 1 invokes a weak operation append (x). When R 1 TOB-delivers append (x), it does not need to reexecute the operation, as it is already executed in a correct order. Then R 1 and R 2 invoke two concurrent operations append (x) and duplicate(). The timestamp of duplicate() is lower than the timestamp of append (x), so the tentative order of execution of these operations is duplicate(), append (x). The RB-cast message regarding duplicate() reaches R 1 before R 1 completes the (speculative) execution of append (x). Since append (x) is a weak operation (returns before TOB completes), R 1 returns the (tentative) response aax, which already reflects the effects of the tentative execution of duplicate(). However, the final execution order, as established by TOB, differs from the one resulting from timestamps. Hence, duplicate(), which is a strong operation and thus completes only after TOB delivers the message issued upon its invocation, returns axax. Had append (x) been a strong operation, it would return ax, which is consistent with the final operation execution order (axax).
Anomalies in Bayou
Clearly, the clients that issued the operations can infer from the return values the order in which Bayou executed the operations. The observed operation execution orders differ between the clients accessing R 1 and R 2 . This kind of anomaly, which we call temporary operation reordering, cannot be avoided if there are two (inconsistent with each other) ways in which operations are ordered by the system. Obviously this behaviour is not present in strongly consistent systems, which ensure that a single global ordering of operation execution is always respected (e.g., [6] , [8] ). The majority of eventually consistent systems which trade consistency for high-availability are also free of this anomaly, because they use only one method for ordering concurrent operations (e.g., [22] [15] [23] ), or support only commutative operations (as in Strong Eventual Consistency [24] ). Interestingly there are protocols that allow some operations to perceive the past events in different (but still legal) orders (e.g., [25] [26]). However, unlike Bayou, they do not require the replicas to eventually agree on a single execution order for all operations.
Bayou exhibits one more anomaly, which comes as very non-intuitive, i.e., circular causality. By analyzing the return values in Figure 1 , one may conclude that the return value of append (x) causally depends on the execution of duplicate () and vice versa (the cycle of causally related operations can contain more operations). Intuitively, when updating operations have no return values (e.g., write to a register) and read-only (RO) operations are executed only locally, on the current replica state, this phenomenon is not present. In Appendix A.1 we present a slightly modified version of Bayou that avoids circular causality and then prove its correctness in Appendix A.2.
Progress in Bayou
Eventually consistent systems are aimed at providing high-availability. It means that a replica is supposed to respond to a request even in the presence of network partitions in the system. This requirement can be differently formalized. In the model considered by Brewer [27] , a network partition can last infinitely. Then high-availability can be formalized as wait-freedom [28] , which means that each request is eventually processed by the system and the response is returned to the client. In the more commonly assumed model that admits only temporary network partitions (we also adopt this model, similarly to, e.g., [15] [23] ), that requirement is not strong enough, since a replica could trivially just wait until the partitions are repaired before executing a request and responding to the client. Hence, in such a model a highly-available system is required to execute each request in a finite number of steps even when no messages are exchanged between the replicas. In this sense, Bayou is highly-available. However, one could formulate a slightly stronger requirement, i.e., bounded wait-freedom [28] . Intuitively it means that there is a bounded number of protocol steps that the replica takes before a response is returned to the client upon invocation of an operation. Interestingly, unlike many popular NoSQL data stores, such as [1] or [3] , Bayou does not guarantee bounded wait-freedom even for weak operations, as we now demonstrate.
Consider a Bayou system with n replicas, one of which, R s , processes requests slower compared to all other replicas. Assume also that every fixed period of time ∆t there are n new weak requests issued, one on each replica, and the processing capabilities of all replicas are saturated. In every ∆t, R s should process all n requests (as do other replicas), but it starts to lag behind, with its backlog constantly growing. Intuitively, every new operation invoked on R s will be scheduled for execution after all operations in the backlog, as they were issued with lower timestamps. Hence the response time will increase with every new invocation on R s . One could try to overcome the problem of the increasing latency on R s by artificially slowing the clock on R s , thus giving unfair priority to the operations issued on R s , compared to operations issued on other replicas. But then any operation invoked on R s would appear on other replicas as an operation from a distant past. In turn, any such operation would cause a growing number of rollbacks on the other replicas.
Strong operations (which require solving distributed consensus) cannot be (bounded) wait-free by definition. The original Bayou protocol uses a primary to establish the final operation execution order. In our pseudocode the same guarantees are achieved using TOB, that can be implemented in a non-blocking fashion [20] through e.g., quorum-based protocols such as Paxos [29] (in contrast to, e.g., the 2-phase-commit protocol [5] that blocks if even one replica is not responding).
Formal framework
Below we provide the formalism that allows us to reason about the properties of Bayou and systems similar to it. We extend the framework by Burckhardt et al. [15] , which has also been used by several other researchers, e.g., [30] [23] [31] [32] (see also [16] for a textbook tutorial).
Executions
We represent information about events executed in a system by an event graph, i.e., a tuple
, where E is the set of events and each d i , i ≥ 1 is an attribute or a relation over E. The attributes and relations in G carry all relevant information regarding the execution, e.g., the return values of the operations invoked by the clients.
For any two events bound by a binary relation rel , we interchangeably use the following notation:
By rel −1 we denote the inverse relation, i.e. (a
For any element a, by rel (a) we denote the set {b|a rel −→ b}, and thus rel
Given two binary relations rel , rel
′ over E, we define the composition rel ; rel
For n ∈ N 0 , we let rel n be the n-ary composition rel ; rel ...; rel , with rel 0 = id E (the identity relation in E). We let rel + = n≥1 rel n and rel
are of the same kind (attribute vs. relation) and if there exists a bijection φ : E → E ′ such that for all d i , where d i is an attribute, and all x ∈ E, we have
, and such that for all d i where d i is a relation, and all x, y ∈ E, we have
Histories and abstract executions
An execution describes precisely how the system operated in a given run. On the other hand, the observable behaviour of a system (as perceived by the clients) is defined using histories. We define a history as an event graph H = (E, op, rval , rb, ß, lvl ) where:
• op describes the operation of an event e, e.g., op(e) = write(3),
• rval describes the value returned by the operation, e.g., rval (e) = 3 or rval (e ′ ) = ∇, if the operation never returns (e ′ is pending in H), • rb is the returns-before relation, which indicates the ordering of non-overlapping operations (one operation returns before the other starts, in real-time), • ß is the same-session relation, that allows us to discern whether operations were executed on the same replica or not, and finally • lvl is an attribute that indicates the consistency level of an event (in Bayou ∀e ∈ E : lvl (e) ∈ {weak , strong }). We consider only well-formed histories, in which time flows in one direction, and in each session (1) operations are executed sequentially (a new operation can be invoked only when the previous one returns) and (2) no operation can follow (according to rb) a pending operation.
In order to explain the history, i.e., the observed return values, we construct abstract executions. An abstract execution of a history H = (E, op, rval , rb, ß, lvl ) is an event graph A = (E, op, rval , rb, ß, lvl , vis, ar , par ) (or, simply A = (H, vis, ar , par )). vis formalizes how operations observe one another: a vis − − → b means that the effects of a are visible to b, when, e.g., a replica that executed a communicated with a replica that executed b prior to b's execution; vis is a natural acyclic relation. ar is an arbitration relation that formalizes the total order of operation execution (thus determining how to resolve conflicts between concurrent updates, i.e., updates not ordered by vis). 4 Our definition of an abstract execution features also the par : E → 2 E×E function, which is necessary to formalize temporary operation reordering. par describes the relative order of operation executions, as perceived by each operation (par (e) defines the total order of all operations, as perceived by e). If ∀e ∈ E : par (e) = ar , then there is no temporary operation reordering in A.
Correctness predicates
A consistency guarantee P(A) is a set of conditions on an abstract execution A, which depend on the particulars of A up to isomorphism. For brevity we usually omit the argument A. We write A |= P if A satisfies P. More precisely: A |= P def ⇐⇒ ∀A ′ : A ′ ≃ A : P(A ′ ). A history H is correct according to some consistency guarantee P (written H |= P) if it can be extended with some vis, ar and par relations to an abstract execution A = (H, vis, ar , par ) that satisfies P.
We say that a consistency guarantee P i is at least as strong as a consistency guarantee P j , denoted P i ≥ P j , if ∀H : H |= P i ⇒ H |= P j . If P i ≥ P j and P j ≥ P i then P i is stronger than P j , denoted P i > P j . If P i ≥ P j and P j ≥ P i , then P i and P j are incomparable, denoted P i ≶ P j .
Replicated data type
In order to correctly define semantics of a distributed system, we model them as replicated data types. Defining the semantics though a sequential specification [33] in some cases might not be sufficient, as in case of multi-value register [24] or OR-Set [34] , which expose concurrency to the client. 5 In our approach, the state on which an operation o executes, called the operation context, is formalized by the event graph of the prior operations visible to o. More precisely, for any event e in an abstract execution A = (E, op, rval , rb, ß, lvl , vis, ar , par ), the operation context of e in A is context (A, e) def = (vis −1 (e), op, vis, ar ). Then, a replicated data type F, such as a replicated counter, set, text sequence, etc., is represented by a function which defines a set of correct return values for any operation o and any operation context C. Moreover, we require that F(o, C) is the same for all isomorphic contexts. Also, if o r is a read-only (RO) operation (denoted o r ∈ readonlyops (F)), for any operation o, an operation context C = (E ′ , op, vis, ar ), E ′ ⊆ E, and every e ∈ E ′ , such that op(e) = o r , we have
Correctness guarantees
In this section we define various correctness guarantees for systems similar to Bayou. We define them as conjunctions of several basic predicates. We start with two simple requirements that should naturally be present in any eventually consistent system. For the discussion below we assume some abstract execution A = (E, op, rval , rb, ß, lvl , vis, ar , par ).
The first requirement is the eventual visibility (EV) of events. EV requires that for any event e in A, there is only a finite number of events in E that do not observe e. Formally: EV def = ∀e : |{e ′ ∈ E : e rb − → e ′ ∧ e vis − − → e ′ }| < ∞. 6 Intuitively, EV implies progress in the system because replicas must synchronize and exchange knowledge about operations submitted to the system. The second requirement concerns avoiding circular causality, as discussed in Section 2.2. To this end we define two auxiliary relations: session order and happens-before. The session order relation so In the following sections we add requirements on the return values of the operations in A. Formalizing the properties of systems similar to Bayou, which admit temporary operation reordering, requires a new approach. We start, however with the traditional one.
Basic Eventual Consistency
Basic Eventual Consistency (BEC) [15] [16] , in addition to EV and NCC, requires that the return value of each operation can be explained using the specification of the replicated data type F, what we formalize as follows: RVal(F) def = ∀e ∈ E : rval (e) = F(op(e), context (A, e)). Then:
In Bayou each replica executes all operations sequentially, and thus we could have used standard sequential data types to accurately model Bayou's semantics. We use replicated data types to account for a wider set of systems. 6 We provide a simpler definition of EV compared to Burckhardt's [16] , because in our model, sessions correspond not to clients but to replicas, whose number must be finite.
In order to specify different guarantees for different classes of operations, as indicated by the lvl attribute, we consider RVal(l, F). Let L = {e ∈ E|lvl (e) = l}. Then:
By the definition of the context function (Section 3.4), when A satisfies RVal(l, F), the return value of any operation with level l is calculated according to the ar relation. It is then easy to see that there are executions of Bayou that do not satisfy RVal(weak , F). It is because weak operations in Bayou (as shown in Section 2.2), might observe past operations in an order that differs from the final operation execution order (ar ). Hence Bayou does not satisfy BEC(weak , F) for arbitrary F.
Fluctuating Eventual Consistency
In
To define the fluctuating variant of BEC, that could be used to formalize the guarantees provided by Bayou we additionally must ensure, that for all events e ′ with level l, par (e ′ ) eventually converges to ar . It means that each e ∈ E can be temporarily observed by the subsequent events e ′ with level l according to an order that differs from ar (but is consistent with par (e)). However, from some moment on, every event e ′ with level l will observe e according to ar . To define this requirement, we use the rank function, which encounts elements of a set S that are in relation rel to element a ∈ S: rank (S, rel , a)
, ar , e)}| < ∞ If A satisfies CPar(l), then for each e with level l, par (e) eventually converges to ar . Now we can define our new consistency criterion Fluctuating Eventual Consistency (FEC):
It is easy to see that BEC(l, F) > FEC(l, F): FEC uses par instead of ar to calculate the return values of operation executions, but par eventually converges to ar . Hence, BEC(l, F) is a special case of FEC(l, F), when ∀e ∈ L : par (e) = ar . In the Appendix A.2.3 and A.2.4 we formally prove that for arbitrary F, Bayou satisfies FEC(weak , F).
Strong consistency
In order to capture the eventual stabilization of operation execution order in Bayou and systems similar to it, we need to define a few additional properties. Intuitively, from the point of view of strong operations, Bayou ensures linearizability [33] : all operations are executed sequentially according to the order established by TOB, as in the state machine replication [6] [35] . Linearizability is a very strong guarantee, impossible to achieve when one tries to optimize the execution of RO operations [36] . Hence, we use sequential consistency (Seq) [37] , a weaker but still very useful guarantee. We adapt the definitions of Seq from [16] to account for the lvl attribute in A.
Informally, Seq guarantees that the system behaves as if all operations were executed in some total order that respects the program order of every replica (or, in our model, every session). Hence, Seq implies RVal(F) and two additional predicates: single order (SinOrd) and session arbitration (SessArb). SinOrd requires that an operation (in event e) observes all operations preceding e according to ar , what can be expressed by vis being equal to ar for all completed operations (events e whose return value is known, i.e., rval (e) = ∇). SessArb simply requires that if for any two events e, e ′ ∈ E, if e so − → e ′ , then e ar − → e ′ . We are interested only in the guarantees for events e ∈ L (events with lvl(e) = l), and thus we restrict SinOrd, SessArb as below. Let
In Appendix A.2.3 and A.2.4 we formally prove that for arbitrary F, Bayou satisfies Seq(strong , F).
Impossibility
Now we generalize our findings to a wide spectrum of systems similar to Bayou. Before we state our formal result, we present the assumptions that it depends on:
• op-driven messages: messages are only generated and sent as a result of some client operation, and not in response to a received message, • input-driven processing: the replicas execute only a finite number of internal steps once no new input events arrive, i.e. operations submitted by clients or received messages; more formally, we say that a replica is passive, if it is in a state in which none of the internal events are enabled (in Bayou, they would correspond to operations on state); a protocol has input-driven processing, if all the replicas are initially passive, and after each input event on a replica, if no further input events are executed, the replica eventually becomes passive; • invisible reads: (weak) RO operations do not alter the state of the executing replica nor issue messages, 7 • highly-available weak operations: the responses for weak requests are returned in a bounded number of steps, • non-blocking strong operations: a strong operation never blocks for communication with all replicas; it may only block until a message TOB-cast is TOB-delivered; then the response is returned in a bounded number of steps. TOB-delivered, The first four requirements are naturally satisfied by any practical highly-available system (they model the write-propagating data stores abstraction [31] ). The last requirement is specific to strongly consistent systems, which provide progress even when some replicas are unresponsive.
We are interested in the behaviour of protocols, both in the fully asynchronous environment, when timing assumptions are consistently broken (e.g. because of prevalent network partitions), and in a stable one, when the minimal amount of synchrony is available so that consensus eventually terminates. Thus, we consider two kinds of runs: asynchronous and stable. Replicas are not aware which kind of a run they are currently executing. In the stable runs, we augment the system with the failure detector Ω, which is an abstraction for the synchronous aspects of the system. We do so implicitly-we equip the replicas with the TOB abstraction that achieves progress only when a failure detector that is at least as strong as Ω is available. Thus, in the asynchronous runs, a system which waits for TOB to complete may block forever. Now we give two auxiliary lemmas. Lemma 1 restates Lemma 6 from [31] , so we skip the proof.
Lemma 1. If a system guarantees BEC(weak , F) in asynchronous runs for arbitrary F, then whenever a weak updating operation is invoked on some replica, a message is RB-cast.
Lemma 2. If a system guarantees BEC(weak , F) in asynchronous runs for arbitrary F, then for every weak RO operation invoked on some passive replica i, in some event e, and every message m, which was RB-cast in some event e ′ and RB-delivered by i before the event e, e ′ vis − − → e.
Proof: Firstly, if a replica is passive and a weak RO operation is invoked on it, it remains passive. Hence, it has to return the response immediately in the invoke event. Secondly, if all subsequent invocations after e will be of weak RO operations, the replica's state will never change after e. Then each such an operation needs to observe the same set of events, and since the system guarantees EV, this set cannot exclude any event. Thus, when evaluating the response in e, the replica needs to take into account all events it is aware of, so also the events it has RB-delivered (by Lemma 1).
The above lemmas concern systems that satisfy BEC(weak , F) (for arbitrary F) in the asynchronous runs and thus systems that do not rely on TOB for weak operations. It means that they will not rely on TOB for weak operations in stable runs as well. Below we state the main result, in which we consider a system that, for arbitrary F, satisfies both BEC(weak , F) in the asynchronous runs and Seq(strong , F) in the stable runs. We show that such a system does not exist: Theorem 1. Let F be an arbitrary replicated data type. If a system guarantees BEC(weak , F) in asynchronous runs, then it does not guarantee BEC(weak , F) ∧ Seq(strong , F) (neither in the asynchronous, nor in the stable runs).
Proof: We conduct the proof by a contradiction using a specially constructed execution, in which the replica executing a strong operation has to return a value without consulting all replicas.
Consider an execution in which the replica i executes a weak updating event a, while the replica j executes a weak updating event b (a and b do not commute). By Lemma 1, they both RB-cast some messages, m a and m b . These messages are RB-delivered by the replica k. Once k becomes passive, a weak RO operation is invoked on it in event r. By Lemma 2, a By analyzing Bayou, we showed that, for arbitrary F, it is possible for an eventually consistent system to satisfy FEC(weak, F), and additionally Seq(strong , F) in stable runs. In contrast, Theorem 1 shows that it is impossible to devise a similar system (for arbitrary F) but one that never admits temporary operation reordering (satisfies BEC(weak , F) instead of FEC(weak , F)). Hence, admitting temporary operation reordering is the inherent cost of mixing eventual and strong consistency when we make no assumptions about the semantics of F. Naturally, for certain replicated data types achieving both BEC(weak , F), and Seq(strong , F) is possible (it is easy to show that it is the case for, e.g., a single distributed register).
Related work
Several researchers attempted a formal analysis of the guarantees provided by Bayou or systems similar to it. For example, the authors of Zeno [18] , which is very similar to Bayou (see below), describe its behaviour using I/O automata. The authors of [38] analyze Bayou and explain it through a formal framework that is tailored to Bayou. Both of these approaches are not as general as ours and do not enable to easily compare the guarantees provided by Bayou and other systems. In [39] , the authors claim that Bayou satisfies a variant of the PL-2L isolation level. This assessment seems inaccurate, as circular causality is not possible in this isolation level. The framework in [30] enables reasoning about eventually consistent systems that enable speculative executions and rollbacks and so also Bayou. However, the framework does not allow one (without extending it) to formalize strong consistency models and thus is not suitable for our purposes.
Numerous frameworks exist, which can be used to model the correctness of systems which enable execution of operations with different levels of consistency. In [15] , Burckhardt et al. provide a fullfledged formal framework for reasoning about systems that mix causal and strong consistency. The latter, however, is understood as barrier instructions based on two-phase-commit [5] . Our approach is more flexible: we do not enforce causal consistency for all operations, and for consensus-based guarantees we do not require that all replicas are responsive. [40] defines RedBlue consistency which distinguishes two kinds of operations: weak (blue), which are causally consistent and strong (red), which are executed in the same order by each replica. Therefore, it does not enforce a global total order of all operations, not even eventually. As a result, there are strong assumptions regarding the types of operations permitted: blue operations must commute with any other operations. The authors of [41] [42] allow operations to be executed with different guarantees which are specified through application-level invariants or restrictions on operation executions. However, they assume causal consistency (CC) as the base property (CC is strictly stronger than FEC).
We are aware of several systems that, similarly to Bayou, enable execution of operations over the same data items with different consistency levels. Bayou fulfills the specification of eventuallyserializable data service (ESDS) [17] , but ESDS additionally allows a programmer to attach to an operation an arbitrary causal context that must be satisfied before the operation is executed. ESDS permits temporary operation reordering. Zeno [18] is similar to Bayou (and thus also admits temporary operation reordering), but has been designed to tolerate Byzantine failures. The system in [43] enables enforcing two kinds of stronger guarantees than causal consistency, by either a consistent numbering of requests, or the use of the three-phase-commit protocol, but unlike Bayou, the system does not enforce a single total order of all client requests, so Theorem 1 does not apply to it. Theorem 1 also does not apply to Gemini [40] which satisfies RedBlue consistency (which fails short of providing Seq(strong , F)), and features only limited semantics. [12] describes global sequence protocol (GSP), in which client applications perform operations locally and periodically synchronize with the cloud. The cloud is responsible for establishing the final operation execution order, which might result in operation rollbacks and reexecutions in the client applications. When the cloud is unavailable, GSP does not guarantee progress (the clients do not observe each others newly submitted operations). Hence, GSP does not exhibit temporary operation reordering (Theorem 1 does not apply to it.
Conclusions
In this paper we used Bayou, one of the first always available, eventually consistent data stores, to demonstrate the interesting but obscure aspects of systems that mix eventual and strong consistency. Our new correctness condition, Fluctuating Eventual Consistency, captures the innate trait of Bayou and systems similar to it: temporary operation reordering. Interestingly, this phenomenon cannot be avoided if an eventually consistent system (of arbitrary semantics) is available under partitions and features any form of distributed consensus-based synchronization. Our framework and formal results will hopefully help the researchers and developers with devising the next-generation highly-available systems with rich semantics.
A Appendix

A.1 Improving Bayou
Before we formalize the guarantees and limitations of Bayou and systems similar to it, we show how Bayou can be easily improved.
A.1.1 Preventing circular causality
Circular causality does not directly follow from temporary operation reordering, but is rather a result of the way Bayou rolls back and reexecutes some operations. To understand why it is so, we show how this phenomenon can be eliminated from Bayou. Consider Algorithm 2, which shows a modification to the invoke() function from Algorithm 1. The changes include:
1. any strong operation is broadcast using TOB only, and 2. upon being submitted, any weak operation is executed immediately on the current state, and then rolled back. 8 Additionally we optimize the execution of weak RO requests. Since any RO request r does not change the logical state of the state, r can be executed only locally.
The first modification means that for any pair of a strong s and a weak operation w, if the return value of any operation e depends on both s and w (e observes s and w), they will be considered in an order consistent with the final operation execution order. We prove it through the following observations:
1. for e to observe s, s must be committed (in the modified algorithm s never appears on the tentative list), 2. if e is a strong operation, then w must also be committed, because upon execution strong operations do not observe operations on the tentative list; hence both operations are observed according to their final execution order, 3. otherwise (e is a weak operation):
(a) w is updating (not RO), because otherwise it would not causally impact the return value of e, (b) if w is already committed, it is similar to case 2, (c) if w is not yet committed, e will consider the operations in the order s, w; once w is delivered by TOB, it will appear on the committed list after s, and so either way e observes s and w according to their final execution order.
The second modification is necessary to prevent circular causality between two (or more) weak operations. Consider the example in Figure 2 , which shows such a problematic execution of the basic Bayou protocol. The execution of append (x) happens similarly to the execution of append (x) from Figure 1 , so the execution order of the operations, as evidenced by the observed return value, is append (y), append (x). On the other hand, even though append (y) is a weak operation, its return value is consistent with the final operation execution order, i.e., append (x), append (y). It is because R 2 TOB-delivers the message TOB-cast upon invocation of append (y) before R 2 completes the execution of append (y).
Our modification from Algorithm 2 prevents such scenarios by executing a weak (updating) operation op without waiting for the RB-cast/TOB-cast message to arrive. Then no concurrent operation op ′ will be executed prior to the first execution of op, whose return value observes the client. Otherwise op could observe op ′ even though the final execution order is op, op ′ . var r = Req(currTime, (i, currEventNo ), strongOp, op) 4:
Algorithm 2
if ¬strongOp then 5:
var response = state .execute(r) 6: return response to client 7:
state.rollback(r) 8:
if op ∈ readonlyops (F) then 9:
RB-cast(r) 10:
TOB-cast(r) 11:
adjustTentativeOrder(r) 12:
reqsAwaitingResp.put(r, ⊥) 14:
append (y) → axy message broadcast through RB message broadcast through TOB executions that return values to clients other executions Figure 2 : Example execution of Bayou showing circular causality between two concurrent weak append () operations on a list. Note that R 2 completes its (initial) execution of append (y) after R 2 TOB-delivered the message regarding append (y). Hence, even though append (y) is a weak operation, its return value is consistent with the final operation execution order.
A.1.2 Ensuring progress of weak operations
Interestingly, our modification to the Bayou protocol makes the execution of weak operations trivially bounded wait-free, as they are executed immediately upon their invocations. However, this improvement comes at the cost of losing some session guarantees, such as read-your-writes [44] . It is because the modified protocol admits an execution in which a client submits two weak operations op, op ′ to the same replica R, and op ′ returns before R delivers any message broadcast upon the invocation of op. We do not explore this subject further.
A.2 Bayou -proofs of correctness
In this section we analyze the correctness properties that the (modified) Bayou and similar protocols guarantee. We outline the system model necessary to conduct the formal proofs. Then we study the correctness of Bayou.
A.2.1 System model
We model the replicas as a set of state automata. Each replica i has a local state and, in reaction to events, executes steps that atomically transition the replica from one state to another. The steps of a protocol can be specified by an algorithm (e.g. the Algorithm 1). Each upon statement corresponds to an event and defines a step of the replica. An event is enabled if its preconditions are met (e.g. RB-deliver is possible if there is a pending message not yet delivered). Events and executions We use (possibly infinite) sequences of events to represent executions of the system. We use the following notation for events: type(arguments) i [msgs] → value, where i is the replica that executes the event, msgs are the messages sent in the step, and value is the response returned to the client. msgs and value are optional and can be omitted. We assume that each event has an implicitly encoded integer value of local clock, which can be used in the step as currTime. 9 The type of the event together with arguments can be one of the following:
• invoke(op, strongOp)
• RB-deliver(msg)
• TOB-deliver(msg )
• rollback() • execute() We call the first three the input events and the other two the internal events. The above internal events are suited to Bayou; other protocols can define their own internal events.
A response can be returned to the client in any step. If a response is returned in an event e of type other than invoke, then e is preceded by some invoke event e ′ on the same replica, and there is no event e ′′ on the same replica between e ′ and e that returns a response. Invoke events are enabled on a replica, only if the previous invoke event on the replica returned a response, or it is followed by an event returning a response.
Protocols that we consider have op-driven messages, which means they only send messages in the invoke events. In the case of Bayou two messages are sent in the invoke event: one using reliable broadcast and one using total-order broadcast. We denote this in the following way:
We also require that protocols have input-driven processing, which means that they execute internal events only as a result of some input events, e.g. an invocation of an operation, or a message delivery. More formally, we say that a replica is passive, if it is in a state in which none of the internal events are enabled; a protocol has input-driven processing, if all the replicas are initially passive, and after each input event on a replica, if no further input events are executed, the replica eventually becomes passive.
We assume that each event in an execution G is associated with some unique identifier and thus can be discerned from others. For each event e we define the following functions:
• rep(e) -the replica that executed e,
• sent(e) -the messages sent in the event,
• pre(e) -the state of the replica just before executing e. Crashes and network properties Replicas may crash silently and cease all communication; a replica that crashes is called faulty, otherwise it is called correct. In a fully asynchronous system, a crashed replica is indistinguishable to its peers from a very slow one, and it is impossible to solve the distributed consensus problem [45] . Real distributed systems which exhibit some amount of synchrony can usually overcome this limitation. E.g. in a quasi-synchronous model [46] , the system is considered to be synchronous, but there exist a non-negligible probability that timing assumptions can be broken. We are interested in the behaviour of protocols, both in the fully asynchronous environment, when timing assumptions are consistently broken (e.g. because of prevalent network partitions), and in a stable one, when the minimal amount of synchrony is available so that consensus eventually terminates. Thus, we consider two kinds of runs: asynchronous runs and stable runs. Replicas are not aware which kind of a run are they currently executing. In the stable runs, we augment the system with the failure detector Ω (which is an abstraction for the synchronous aspects of the system). We do so implicitly; namely, we equip the replicas with the total-order broadcast mechanism, known to require Ω to terminate, but guarantee it achieves progress only in the stable runs.
We have specified only RB-cast and TOB-cast message broadcast primitives, but other kinds of communication can be easily achieved; e.g. point-to-point communication can be achieved by RB-casting a message, and ignoring it by all the replicas other than the recipient. For simplicity, we assume that each message RB-cast or TOB-cast is unique. In all runs we guarantee the basic properties of reliable message passing as in [47] . Since messages broadcast using TOB are delivered by all replicas in the same order, we use tobNo(m) to signify the sequence number of the TOB-deliver events on any replica in which m is TOB-delivered (and is equal ⊥ if m is never TOB-delivered by any replica). We also require that TOB respects the order in which any replicas TOB-casts messages (FIFO order), and that if a message m was both RB-cast and TOB-cast by some (correct or faulty) replica i, and m was RB-delivered by some correct replica, then eventually all correct replicas TOB-deliver it. These additional guarantees are non-standard, but because they can be easily achieved, and are in fact required by the Bayou protocol, we include them for simplicity.
Correctness. An execution is fair if all replicas execute infinitely many steps of each type of an enabled event, e.g., infinitely many RB-deliver events for infinitely many messages RB-cast in the execution. Formally, an infinite execution G is fair if for each replica i, and each event type t, G contains infinitely many events of type t executed by i, or i has infinitely many states in which no event of type t is enabled.
We analyze the correctness of a protocol by evaluating a single arbitrary infinite fair execution of the protocol, similarly to [16] [31] . If the execution satisfies the check for the desired properties, then all the executions of the protocol (including finite ones and the ones featuring crashed replicas) satisfy all the safety aspects verified (nothing bad ever happens [48] [49] ). Additionally, all fair executions of the protocol satisfy liveness aspects (something good eventually happens).
We say that a system handles weak operations in a highly-available manner, if and only if, for each invoke event e with strongOp = false in a fair execution, the corresponding response is returned in some event e ′ , which happens on the same replica a bounded number of steps from e. We say that a system handles strong operations in a non-blocking manner, if and only if, for each invoke event e with strongOp = true in a fair execution, a corresponding response is returned in some event e ′ , which is a bounded number of steps of the same replica, either from e, or from a TOB-deliver(m) event on the same replica, where (TOB-cast m) ∈ sent(e). Observable behaviour. We associate invoke events in an execution with the abstract event identifiers present in a history H as defined in Section 3. We construct H = (E, op, rval , rb, ß, lvl ) from any given execution G in the following way. Let E be the set of all invoke events in G, and for any e = invoke(op, strongOp) ∈ E, let lvl(e) = strong ⇔ strongOp = true, op(e) be the operation op invoked in e, and rval (e) be the response returned in e if any, or the response returned in the first subsequent event on the same replica which returns a response, or ∇ if there is no such event. For any two events e, e ′ : e rb − → e ′ , if and only if, the event in which the response for e is returned, precedes e ′ in G; e ß − → e ′ ⇔ rep(e) = rep(e ′ ). We say that a system provides some consistency guarantee P if for each fair execution G of the system, the constructed history H is such that H |= P.
A.2.2 The state properties
Take the list of requests that were executed on the state, and remove the requests which were rolled back; we call the resulting sequence α the current trace of the state. Since the state encapsulates the state of the system after locally executing and revoking requests, we require that the 
state's responses are consistent with a deterministic serial execution of α as specified by the type specification F. In Bayou, α = executed · reverse(toBeRolledBack ), because:
• requests are executed only if toBeRolledBack is empty,
• whenever a request is executed it is added to the executed list, thus it is appended to the end of α, • in the adjustExecution function, some requests move from the executed list to the end of the toBeRolledBack list, thus not changing their position in α, • whenever a request is rolled back, it is removed from the head of the toBeRolledBack list, and thus removed from the end of α, consistently with the definition of a trace. Algorithm 3 shows a pseudocode of StateObject, a referential implementation of state for arbitrary F (a specialized one can be used for a specific F). We assume that each operation can be specified as a composition of read and write operations on registers together with some local computation. The assumption is sensible, as the operations are executed locally, in a sequential manner, and thus no stronger primitives than registers (such as CAS, fetch-and-add, etc.) are necessary. The StateObject keeps an undo log which allows it to revoke the effects of any request executed so far.
A.2.3 Bayou in stable runs
Now we formally characterize the modified Bayou's behaviour in stable runs. Theorem 2. Bayou satisfies FEC(weak , F) ∧ Seq(strong , F) in stable runs for arbitrary F.
Proof: For an arbitrary fair execution G, we obtain its history H = (E, op, rval , rb, ß, lvl ). We construct the relations vis, ar , and par (e) for each e ∈ E, which we then use together with H to form an abstract execution A. We need to show that A |= FEC(weak , F) ∧ Seq(strong , F). However, for FEC we show a stronger result, A |= FEC(weak , F) ∧ FEC(strong , F), to help us with a later proof.
We define the following functions over E:
• req (e) -the request issued in the event e,
• tob(e) -whether req (e) was TOB-cast (tob(e) = true ⇔ (TOB-cast req(e)) ∈ sent(e)),
• tobdel (e) -whether req(e) was TOB-delivered by any replica (tobdel (e) = true ⇔ tobNo(req (e)) = ⊥). Note that tob(e) = true only for updating events (op(e) ∈ readonlyops (F)) and strong RO ones (op(e) ∈ readonlyops (F) ∧ lvl (e) = strong ). Also notice that in stable runs the following holds: tob(e) ⇔ tobdel (e).
First, note that we can compare lexicographically requests generated (and thus also messages exchanged) in Bayou -a request is a tuple of values. The first element of the tuple is the timestamp, while the second one is a dot, which itself is a pair. Dots, uniquely identify requests, as the currEventNo grows strictly monotonically on each replica with each invoke event, and the replica number i is unique for any replica. Thus, each request is unique (the function req is a bijection), and all requests induce a total order over E.
For an event e ∈ E, such that rval (e) = ∇, let ret (e) denote the event r ∈ G, in which the response rval (e) was computed. We can define r formally as follows:
• r = e, if lvl (e) = weak , or • r is an execute event, such that rep(r) = rep(e) and req(e) is the head of pre(r).toBeExecuted . The second point unambiguously identifies a single event. This is because strong operations in the modified protocol are disseminated only using TOB. When a strong request is TOB-delivered, it is added to the committed list, and thus it cannot be rolled back. Hence, a request that is only TOB-cast will be executed exactly once by each replica. Arbitration. The final arbitration order for TOB-cast events (updating or strong RO) in Bayou is determined by the order imposed by TOB. Although RO operations, by definition, do not influence the return values of any other operation, for completeness, the weak RO events also have to be included in ar . We establish the total order of all operations by mixing the TOB order for events which were TOB-cast, and the inherent order induced by the requests themselves: e In the above definition two events are ordered in the par (ê) according to their position on exec ′ (ê) list, if they both exist on the list. All the events that are not on the list, but could have been, because they were TOB-cast, are ordered after all the events that are on the list. All the weak RO events (which are not present in the list, and not TOB-cast), are ordered relatively to the events on the list according to ar . Similarly, any two events which are both not on the list (irregardless whether they were TOB-cast), are ordered according to ar . Clearly, par (ê) is a total order over E.
It is also easy to see that par (ê), with each subsequent eventê, converges to ar . This is caused by the fact that each message TOB-delivered puts some request r in the committed list, and for any two events e, e ′ , such that req(e), req (e ′ ) ∈ pre(ê).committed , e − −−− → e ⇔ e ′ ar − → e. Thus, A |= CPar(weak ) ∧ CPar(strong ). Visibility. We define the visibility relation through the perceived arbitration order. An event e is visible to some other event e ′ if it is perceived by e ′ to happen before it: e It was shown in Section A.1 that the modified protocol does not suffer from the circular causality anomaly, which means that the relation hb must be acyclic, and thus A |= NCC. Return values. To prove that A |= FEC(weak , F) ∧ FEC(strong , F) it remains to show that A |= FRVal(weak , F) ∧ FRVal(strong , F), i.e. that for any e ∈ E, rval (e) = F(op(e), c), where c = fcontext(A, e) = (V, vis, par (e), op) and V = vis −1 (e). Let c ′ = (V ′ , vis, par (e), op) be a context obtained from c be removing all events e ′ from V , such that op(e ′ ) ∈ readonlyops (F)∧lvl (e) = weak . By the definition of a RO operation F(op(e), c) = F(op(e), c ′ ). Notice, that e ′ ∈ V ′ ⇔ req (e ′ ) ∈ exec(e). It is easy to see now that c ′ is isomorphic with c ′′ = (V ′′ , exec(e), exec(e), op ′ ), where V ′′ = {r|req −1 (r) ∈ V ′ } and op ′ (r) = r.op, for any request r. Thus, F(op(e), c ′ ) = F(op(e), c ′′ ). Since we know that the state's responses are consistent with F, and that exec(e) is the current trace of the state when rval (e) is computed, rval (e) = F(op(e), c ′′ ) = F(op(e), c). Strong operations. For strong operations we have to additionally prove that A |= SinOrd(strong )∧ SessArb(strong ) ∧ RVal(strong , F). Let us begin with SinOrd(strong ). Let e be some event such that lvl (e) = strong . Since tobdel (e), rval (e) = ∇ (e is not pending). We have to show that for any event e ′ , e ′ vis − − → e ⇔ e ′ ar − → e. Obviously, exec(e) = pre(ret (e)).committed . For any event e ′ which was TOB-cast, e ′ ∈ exec(e) ⇔ tobNo(e ′ ) < tobNo(e) ⇔ e ′ ar − → e. Thus, e ′ par (e) − −−− → e ⇔ e ′ ar − → e.
For any event e ′ which was not TOB-cast, by definition, e ′ par (e) − −−− → e ⇔ e ′ ar − → e. Therefore, e ′ vis − − → e ⇔ e ′ ar − → e. Also, notice that par (e) = ar . Let us consider SessArb(strong ). Let e be some event such that lvl (e) = strong . It is easy to see, that for any event e ′ , such that e ′ so − → e, if e ′ was TOB-cast, then tobNo(e ′ ) < tobNo(e) (by the FIFO requirement), on the other hand, if e ′ was not TOB-cast then, req(e ′ ) < req (e). Thus e ′ ar − → e.
